Randomized algorithms are often enjoyed for their simplicity, but the hash functions used to yield the desired theoretical guarantees are often neither simple nor practical. Here we show that the simplest possible tabulation hashing provides unexpectedly strong guarantees.
INTRODUCTION
An important target of the analysis of algorithms is to determine whether there exist practical schemes, which enjoy mathematical guarantees on performance.
Hashing and hash tables are one of the most common inner loops in real-world computation, and are even built-in "unit cost" operations in high level programming languages that offer associative arrays. Often, these inner loops dominate the overall computation time. Knuth gave birth to * A full version of this paper is available as arXiv:1011.5200.
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy otherwise, to republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. the analysis of algorithms in 1963 [12] when he analyzed linear probing, the most popular practical implementation of hash tables. Assuming a perfectly random hash function, he bounded the expected number of probes. However, we do not have perfectly random hash functions. The approach of algorithms analysis is to understand when simple and practical hash functions work well. The most popular multiplication-based hashing schemes maintain the O(1) running times when the sequence of operations has sufficient randomness [13] . However, they fail badly even for very simple input structures like an interval of consecutive keys [15, 17, 23] , giving linear probing an undeserved reputation of being non-robust.
On the other hand, the approach of algorithm design (which may still have a strong element of analysis) is to construct (more complicated) hash functions providing the desired mathematical properties. This is usually done in the influential k-independence paradigm of Wegman and Carter [24] . It is known that 5-independence is sufficient [15] and necessary [17] for linear probing. Then one can use the best available implementation of 5-independent hash functions, the tabulation-based method of [22, 23] .
Here we analyze simple tabulation hashing. This scheme views a key x as a vector of c characters x1, . . . , xc. For each character position, we initialize a totally random table Ti, and then use the hash function
This is a well-known scheme dating back at least to Wegman and Carter [24] . From a practical view-point, tables Ti can be small enough to fit in fast cache, and the function is probably the easiest to implement beyond the bare multiplication. However, the scheme is only 3-independent, and was therefore assumed to have weak mathematical properties. We note that if the keys are drawn from a universe of size u, and hash values are machine words, the space required is O(cu 1/c ) words. The idea is to make this fit in fast cache. We also note that the hash values are bit strings, so when we hash into bins, the number of bins is generally understood to be a power of two.
The challenge in analyzing simple tabulation is the significant dependence between keys. Nevertheless, we show that the scheme works in some of the most important randomized algorithms, including linear probing and several instances when Ω(lg n)-independence was previously needed. We confirm our findings by experiments: simple tabulation is competitive with just one 64-bit multiplication, and the hidden constants in the analysis appear to be very acceptable in practice.
In many cases, our analysis gives the first provably good implementation of an algorithm which matches the algorithm's conceptual simplicity if one ignores hashing.
Desirable properties. We will focus on the following popular properties of truly random hash functions.
• The worst-case query time of chaining is O(lg n/ lg lg n) with high probability (w.h.p.). More generally, when distributing balls into bins, the bin load obeys Chernoff bounds.
• Linear probing runs in expected O(1) time per operation. Variance and all constant moments are also O(1).
• Cuckoo hashing: Given two tables of size m ≥ (1+ε)n, it is possible to place a ball in one of two randomly chosen locations without any collision, with probability 1 − O( . This can be used to quickly estimate the intersection of two sets, and follows from a property called minwise independence: for any x / ∈ S,
As defined by Wegman and Carter [24] in 1977, a family
, the hash codes h(x1), . . . , h(x k ) are independent random variables, and the hash code of any fixed x is uniformly distributed in [m] .
Chernoff bounds continue to work with high enough independence [18] ; for instance, independence Θ( lg n lg lg n ) suffices for the bound on the maximum bin load. For linear probing, 5-independence is sufficient [15] and necessary [17] . For cuckoo hashing, O(lg n)-independence suffices and at least 6-independence is needed [3] . While minwise independence cannot be achieved, one can achieve ε-minwise independence with the guarantee (
) independence is sufficient [10] and necessary [17] . (Note that the ε is a bias so it is a lower bound on how well set intersection can be approximated, with any number of independent experiments.)
The canonical construction of k-independent hash functions is a random degree k − 1 polynomial in a prime field, which has small representation but Θ(k) evaluation time. Competitive implementations of polynomial hashing simulate arithmetic modulo Mersenne primes via bitwise operations. Even so, tabulation-based hashing with O(u 1/c ) space and O(ck) evaluation time is significantly faster [22] . The linear dependence on k is problematic, e.g., when k ≈ lg n.
Siegel [19] shows that a family with superconstant independence but O(1) evaluation time requires Ω(u ε ) space, i.e. it requires tabulation. He also gives a solution that uses O(u 1/c ) space, c O(c) evaluation time, and achieves u
independence (which is superlogarithmic, at least asymptotically). The construction is non-uniform, assuming a certain small expander which gets used in a graph product. Dietzfelbinger and Rink [6] use universe splitting to obtain similar high independence with some quite different costs. Instead of being highly independent on the whole universe, their goal is to be highly independent on an unknown but fixed set S of size n. For some constant parameter γ, they tolerate an error probability of n −γ . Assuming no error, their hash function is highly independent on S. The evaluation time is constant and the space is sublinear. For error probability n −γ , each hash computation calls O(γ) subroutines, each of which evaluates its own degree O(γ) polynomial. The price for a lower error tolerance is therefore a slower hash function (even if we only count it as constant time in theory). While polynomial hashing may perform better than its independence suggests, we have no positive example yet. On the tabulation front, we have one example of a good hash function that is not formally k-independent: cuckoo hashing works with an ad hoc hash function that combines space O(n 1/c ) and polynomials of degree O(c) [8] .
Our results
Here we provide an analysis of simple tabulation showing that it has many of the desirable properties above. For most of our applications, we want to rule out certain obstructions with high probability. This follows immediately if certain events are independent, and the algorithms design approach is to pick a hash function guaranteeing this independence, usually in terms of a highly independent hash function.
Instead we here stick with simple tabulation with all its dependencies. This means that we have to struggle in each individual application to show that the dependencies are not fatal. However, from an implementation perspective, this is very attractive, leaving us with one simple and fast scheme for (almost) all our needs.
In all our results, we assume the number of characters is c = O(1). The constants in our bounds will depend on c. Our results use a rather diverse set of techniques analyzing the table dependencies in different types of problems. For chaining and linear probing, we rely on some concentration results, which will also be used as a starting point for the analysis of min-wise hashing. Theoretically, the most interesting part is the analysis for cuckoo hashing, with a very intricate study of the random graph constructed by the two hash functions.
Chernoff bounds. We first show that simple tabulation preserves Chernoff-type concentration: Theorem 1. Consider hashing n balls into m ≥ n 1−1/(2c) bins by simple tabulation. Let q be an additional query ball, and define Xq as the number of regular balls that hash into a bin chosen as a function of h(q).
. The following probability bounds hold for any constant γ:
For any m ≤ n 1−1/(2c) , every bin gets
keys with probability 1 − n −γ .
Contrasting standard Chernoff bounds (see, e.g., [14] ), Theorem 1 can only provide polynomially small probability, i.e. at least n −γ for any desired constant γ. In addition, the exponential dependence on µ in (1) and (2) is reduced by a constant which depends (exponentially) on the constants γ and c. It is possible to get some super polynomially small bounds with super constant γ but they are not as clean. An alternative way to understand the bound is that our tail bound depends exponentially on εµ, where ε decays to subconstant as we move more than inversely polynomial out in the tail. Thus, our bounds are sufficient for any polynomially high probability guarantee. However, compared to the standard Chernoff bound, we would have to tolerate a constant factor more balls in a bin to get the same failure probability.
By the union bound (1) implies that with m = Θ(n) bins, no bin receives more than O(lg n/ lg lg n) balls w.h.p. This is the first realistic hash function to achieve this fundamental property. Similarly, for linear probing with fill bounded below 1, (2) shows that the longest filled interval is of length O(log n) w.h.p.
Linear probing. Building on the above concentration bounds, we show that if the table size is m = (1 + ε)n, then the expected time per operation is O(1/ε 2 ), which asymptotically matches the bound of Knuth [12] for a truly random function. In particular, this compares positively with the O(1/ε 13/6 ) bound of [15] for 5-independent hashing. Our proof is a combinatorial reduction that relates the performance of linear probing to concentration bounds. The results hold for any hash function with concentration similar to Theorem 1. To illustrate the generality of the approach, we also improve the O(1/ε 13/6 ) bound from [15] for 5-independent hashing to the optimal O(1/ε 2 ). This was raised as an open problem in [15] .
For simple tabulation, we get quite strong concentration results for the time per operation, e.g " constant variance for constant ε. For contrast, with 5-independent hashing, the variance is only known to be O(log n) [15, 23] .
Cuckoo hashing. In general, the cuckoo hashing algorithm fails iff the random bipartite graph induced by two hash functions contains a component with more vertices than edges. With truly random hashing, this happens with probability Θ( 1 n ). Here we study the random graphs induced by simple tabulation, and obtain a rather unintuitive result: the optimal failure probability is inversely proportional to the cube root of the set size.
Theorem 2. Any set of n keys can be placed in two table of size m = (1 + ε) by cuckoo hashing and simple tabulation with probability 1 − O(n −1/3 ). There exist sets on which the failure probability is Ω(n −1/3 ).
Thus, cuckoo hashing and simple tabulation are an excellent construction for a static dictionary. The dictionary can be built (in linear time) after trying O(1) independent hash functions w.h.p., and later every query runs in constant worst-case time with two probes. We note that even though cuckoo hashing requires two independent hash functions, these essentially come for the cost of one in simple tabulation: the pair of hash codes can be stored consecutively, in the same cache line, making the running time comparable with evaluating just one hash function.
In the dynamic case, Theorem 2 implies that we expect Ω(n 4/3 ) updates between failures requiring a complete rehash with new hash functions.
Our proof involves a complex understanding of the intricate, yet not fatal dependencies in simple tabulation. The proof is a (complicated) algorithm that assumes that cuckoo hashing has failed, and uses this knowledge to compress the random tables T1, . . . , Tc below the entropy lower bound.
Using our techniques, it is also possible to show that if n balls are placed in O(n) bins in an online fashion, choosing the least loaded bin at each time, the maximum load is O(lg lg n) in expectation.
Minwise independence. In the full version, we show that simple tabulation is ε-minwise independent, for a vanishingly small ε (inversely polynomial in the set size). This would require Θ(log n) independence by standard techniques.
Theorem 3. Consider a set S of n = |S| keys and q / ∈ S. Then with h implemented by simple tabulation:
This can be used to estimate the size of set intersection by estimating:
For good bounds on the probabilities, we would make multiple experiments with independent hash functions. An alternative based on a single hash function is that we for each set consider the k elements with the smallest hash values. We will also present concentration bounds for this alternative.
Fourth moment bounds. An alternative to Chernoff bounds in proving good concentration is to use bounded moments. In the full version of the paper, we analyze the 4 th moment of a bin's size when balls are placed into bins by simple tabulation. For a fixed bin, we show that the 4 th moment comes extremely close to that achieved by truly random hashing: it deviates by a factor of 1 + O(4 c /m), which is tiny except for a very large number of characters c. This would require 4-independence by standard arguments. This limited 4 th moment for a given bin was discovered independently by [1] .
If we have a designated query ball q, and we are interested in the size of a bin chosen as a function of h(q), the 4 th moment of simple tabulation is within a constant factor of that achieved by truly random hashing (on close inspection of the proof, that constant is at most 2). This would require 5-independence by standard techniques. (See [17] for a proof that 4-independence can fail quite badly when we want to bound the size of the bin in which q lands.) Our proof exploits an intriguing phenomenon that we identify in simple tabulation: in any fixed set of 5 keys, one of them has a hash code that is independent of the other four's hash codes.
Unlike our Chernoff-type bounds, the constants in the 4 th moment bounds can be analyzed quite easily, and are rather tame. Compelling applications of 4 th moment bounds were given by [11] and [21] . In [11] , it was shown that any hash function with a good 4 th moment bound suffices for a nonrecursive version of quicksort, routing on the hypercube, etc. In [21] , linear probing is shown to have constant expected performance if the hash function is a composition of universal hashing down to a domain of size O(n), with a strong enough hash function on this small domain (i.e. any hash function with a good 4 th moment bound). We will also use 4 th moment bounds to attain certain bounds of linear probing not covered by our Chernoff-type bounds. In the case of small fill α = n m = o(1), we use the 4 th moment bounds to show that the probability of a full hash location is O(α).
Pseudorandom numbers. The tables used in simple tabulation should be small to fit in the first level of cache. Thus, filling them with truly random numbers would not be difficult (e.g. in our experiments we use atmospheric noise from random.org). If the amount of randomness needs to be reduced further, we remark that all proofs continue to hold if the tables are filled by a Θ(lg n)-independent hash function (e.g. a polynomial with random coefficients). With this modification, simple tabulation naturally lends itself to an implementation of a very efficient pseudorandom number generator. We can think of a pseudorandom generator as a hash function on range [n], with the promise that each h(i) is evaluated once, in the order of increasing i. To use simple tabulation, we break the universe into two, very lopsided characters: [
, for R chosen to be Θ(lg n). Here the second coordinate is least significant, that is, (x, y) represents xR + y. During initialization, we fill T2[1 . . R] with R truly random numbers. The values of T1[1 . . n/R] are generated on the fly, by a polynomial of degree Θ(lg n), whose coefficients were chosen randomly during initialization. Whenever we start a new row of the matrix, we can spend a relatively large amount of time to evaluate a polynomial to generate the next value r1 which we store in a register. For the next R calls, we run sequentially through T2, xoring each value with r1 to provide a new pseudorandom number. With T2 fitting in fast memory and scanned sequentially, this will be much faster than a single multiplication, and with R large, the amortized cost of generating r1 is insignificant. The pseudorandom generator has all the interesting properties discussed above, including Chernoff-type concentration, minwise independence, and random graph properties.
Experimental evaluation. We performed an experimental evaluation of simple tabulation. Our implementation uses tables of 256 entries (i.e. using c = 4 characters for 32-bit data and c = 8 characters with 64-bit data). The time to evaluate the hash function turns out to be competitive with multiplication-based 2-independent functions, and significantly better than for hash functions with higher independence. We also evaluated simple tabulation in applications, in an effort to verify that the constants hidden in our analysis are not too large. Simple tabulation proved very robust and fast, both for linear probing and for cuckoo hashing.
Contents of extended abstract. We only have room to present the most essential results; namely the Chernoff style concentration from Theorem 1 and the results for Cuckoo hashing from Theorem 2.
Notation. We now introduce some notation that will be used throughout the proofs. We want to construct hash functions h : . It is convenient to think of each hash code Ti[xi] as a fraction in [0, 1) with large enough precision. We always assume m is a power of two, so an m-bit hash code is obtained by keeping only the most significant log 2 m bits in such a fraction. We always assume the table stores long enough hash codes, i.e. at least log 2 m bits.
Let S ⊂ Σ c be a set of |S| = n keys, and let q be a query. We typically assume q / ∈ S, since the case q ∈ S only involves trivial adjustments (for instance, when looking at the load of the bin h(q), we have to add one when q ∈ S). Let π(S, i) be the projection of S on the i-th coordinate,
We define a position-character to be an element of [c] × Σ. Then, the alphabets on each coordinate can be assumed to be disjoint: the first coordinate has alphabet {1} × Σ, the second has alphabet {2} × Σ, etc. Under this view, we can treat a key x as a set of q position-characters (on distinct positions). Furthermore, we can assume h is defined on position characters: h((i, α)) = Ti [α] . This definition is extended to keys (sets of position-characters) in the natural way h(x) = α∈x h(α).
When we say with high probability in r, we mean 1 − r a for any desired constant a. Since c = O(1), high probability in |Σ| is also high probability in u. If we just say high probability, it is in n.
CONCENTRATION BOUNDS
This section proves Theorem 1, except branch (3) which is shown in the full version of the paper.
If n elements are hashed into n 1+ε bins by a truly random hash function, the maximum load of any bin is O(1) with high probability. First we show that simple tabulation preserves this guarantee. Building on this, we shows that the load of any fixed bin obeys Chernoff bounds. Finally we show that the Chernoff bound holds even for a bin chosen as a function of the query hash code, h(q).
As stated in the introduction, the number of bins is always understood to be a power of two. This is because our hash values are xor'ed bit strings. If we want different numbers of bins we could view the hash values as fractions in the unit interval and divide the unit interval into subintervals. Translating our results to this setting is standard.
Hashing into Many Bins.The notion of peeling lies at the heart of most work in tabulation hashing. If a key from a set of keys contains one position-character that doesn't appear in the rest of the set, its hash code will be independent of the rest. Then, it can be "peeled" from the set, as its behavior matches that with truly random hashing. More formally, we say a set T of keys is peelable if we can arrange the keys of T in some order, such that each key contains a positioncharacter that doesn't appear among the previous keys in the order.
Lemma 4. Suppose we hash n ≤ m 1−ε keys into m bins, for some constant ε > 0. For any constant γ, all bins get less
keys with probability
Proof. We will show that among any d elements, one can find a peelable subset of size t ≥ max{d 1/c , lg d}. Then, a necessary condition for the maximum load of a bin to be at least d is that some bin contain t peelable elements. There are at most n t < n t such sets. Since the hash codes of a peelable set are independent, the probability that a fixed set lands into a common bin is 1 m t−1 . Thus, an upper bound on the probability that the maximum load is d can . Pick some element from T for every character value in π(S, i); this is a peelable set of t = d 1/c elements. To prove t ≥ log 2 d, we proceed iteratively. Consider the coordinate giving the largest projection, j = arg maxi |π(T, i)|. As long as |T | ≥ 2, |π(T, j)| ≥ 2. Let α be the most popular value in T for the j-th character, and let T contain only elements with α on the j-th coordinate. We have |T | ≥ |T |/|π(T, j)|. In the peelable subset, we keep one element for every value in π(T, j) \ {α}, and then recurse in T to obtain more elements. In each recursion step, we obtain k ≥ 1 elements, at the cost of decreasing log 2 |T | by log 2 (k + 1). Thus, we obtain at least log 2 d elements overall.
We note that, when the subset of keys of interest forms a combinatorial cube, the probabilistic analysis in the proof is sharp up to constant factors. In other words, the exponential dependence on c and γ is inherent.
Chernoff Bounds for a Fixed Bin.We study the number of keys ending up in a prespecified bin B. The analysis will define a total ording ≺ on the space of position-characters, [c] × Σ. Then we will analyze the random process by fixing hash values of position-characters h(α) in the order ≺. The hash value of a key x ∈ S becomes known when the positioncharacter max≺ x is fixed. For α ∈ [c] × Σ, we define the group Gα = {x ∈ S | α = max≺ x}, the set of keys for whom α is the last position-character to be fixed.
The intuition is that the contribution of each group Gα to the bin B is a random variable independent of the previous G β 's, since the elements Gα are shifted by a new hash code h(α). Thus, if we can bound the contribution of Gα by a constant, we can apply Chernoff bounds.
Lemma 5. There is an ordering ≺ such that the maximal group size is maxα |Gα| ≤ n 1−1/c .
Proof. We start with S being the set of all keys, and reduce S iteratively, by picking a position-character α as next in the order, and removing keys Gα from S. At each point in time, we pick the position-character α that would minimize |Gα|. Note that, if we pick some α as next in the order, Gα will be the set of keys x ∈ S which contain α and contain no other character that hasn't been fixed:
We have to prove is that, as long as S = ∅, there exists α with |Gα| ≤ |S| From now on assume the ordering ≺ has been fixed as in the lemma. This ordering partitions S into at most n nonempty groups, each containing at most n 1−1/c keys. We say a group Gα is d-bounded if no bin contains more than d keys from Gα.
, and δ > 0, the bounds are:
Let Xα be the number of elements from Gα landing in the bin B. We are quite close to applying Chernoff bounds to the sequence Xα, which would imply the desired concentration around µ = n m
. Two technical problems remain: Xα's are not d-bounded in the worst case, and they are not independent.
To address the first problem, we define the sequence of random variablesXα as follows: if Gα is d-bounded, let Xα = Xα; otherwiseXα = |Gα|/m is a constant. Observe that αX α coincides with α Xα if all groups are d-bounded, which happens with probability 1 − m −γ . Thus a probabilistic bound on αX α is a bound on α Xα up to an additive m −γ in the probability. Finally, theXα variables are not independent: earlier position-character dictate how keys cluster in a later group. Fortunately (4) holds even if the distribution of each Xi is a function of X1, . . . , Xi−1, as long as the mean E[Xi | X1, . . . , Xi−1] is a fixed constant µi independent of X1, ..., Xi−1. We claim that our means are fixed this way: regardless of the hash codes for β < α, we will argue that E[Xα] = µα = |Gα|/m.
Observe that whether or not Gα is d-bounded is determined before h(α) is fixed in the order ≺. Indeed, α is the last position-character to be fixed for any key in Gα, so the hash codes of all keys in Gα have been fixed up to an xor with h(α). This final shift by h(α) is common to all the keys, so it cannot change whether or not two elements land together in a bin. Therefore, the choice of h(α) does not change if Gα is d-bounded.
After fixing all hash codes β ≺ α, we decide if Gα is dbounded. If not, we setXα = |Gα|/m. OtherwiseXα = Xα is the number of elements we get in B when fixing h(α), and h(α) is a uniform random variable sending each element to B with probability 1/m. Therefore E[Xα] = |Gα|/m. This completes the proof that the number of keys in bin B obeys Chernoff bounds from (4), which immediately imply (1) and (2) in Theorem 1.
The Load of a Query-Dependent Bin. When we are dealing with a special key q (a query), we may be interested in the load of a bin Bq, chosen as a function of the query's hash code, h(q). We show that the above analysis also works for the size of Bq, up to small constants. The critical change is to insist that the query position-characters come first in our ordering ≺:
There is an ordering ≺ placing the characters of q first, in which the maximal group size is 2 · n 1−1/c .
Proof. After placing the characters of q at the beginning of the order, we use the same iterative construction as in Lemma 5. Each time we select the position-character α minimizing |Gα|, place α next in the order ≺, and remove Gα from S. It suffices to prove that, as long as S = ∅, there exists a position-character α / ∈ q with |Gα| ≤ 2 · |S| The lemma guarantees that the first nonempty group contains the query alone, and all later groups have random shifts that are independent of the query hash code. We lost a factor two on the group size, which has no effect on our asymptotic analysis. In particular, all groups are d-bounded w.h.p. Letting Xα be the contribution of Gα to bin Bq, we see that the distribution of Xα is determined by the hash codes fixed previously (including the hash code of q, fixing the choice of the bin Bq). But E[Xα] = |Gα|/m holds irrespective of the previous choices. Thus, Chernoff bounds continue to apply to the size of Bq. This completes the proof of (1) and (2) in Theorem 1.
In Theorem 1 we limited ourselves to polynomially small error bounds m −γ for constant γ. However, we could also consider a super constant γ = ω(1) using the formula for d in Lemma 6. For the strongest error bounds, we would balance m −γ with the Chernoff bounds from (4). Such balanced error bounds would be messy, and we found it more appealing to elucidate the standard Chernoff-style behavior when dealing with polynomially small errors.
ANALYSIS OF CUCKOO HASHING
We begin with the negative side of our result: Observation 8. There exists a set S of n keys such that cuckoo hashing with simple tabulation hashing cannot place S into two tables of size 2n with probability Ω(n −1/3 ).
Proof. The hard instance is the 3-dimensional cube
Here is a sufficient condition for cuckoo hashing to fail:
• there exist a, b, c ∈ [n 1/3 ] 2 with h0(a) = h0(b) = h0(c);
• there exist x, y ∈ [n 1/3 ] with h1(x) = h1(y).
If both happen, then the elements ax, ay, bx, by, cx, cy cannot be hashed. Indeed, on the left side h0(a) = h0(b) = h0(c) so they only occupy 2 positions. On the right side, h1(x) = h1(y) so they only occupy 3 positions. In total they occupy 5 < 6 positions.
The probability of 1. is asymptotically (n 2/3 ) 3 /n 2 = Ω(1). This is because tabulation (on two characters) is 3-independent. The probability of 2. is asymptotically (n 1/3 ) 2 /n = Ω(1/n 1/3 ). So overall cuckoo hashing fails with probability Ω(n −1/3 ). Our positive result will effectively show that this is the worst possible instance: for any set S, the failure probability is O(n −1/3 ). The proof is an encoding argument. A tabulation hash function from Σ c → [m] has entropy |Σ| c lg m bits; we have two random functions h0 and h1. If, under some event E, one can encode the two hash functions h0, h1 using 2|Σ| c lg m − γ bits, it follows that Pr[E] = O(2 −γ ). Letting ES denote the event that cuckoo hashing fails on the set of keys S, we will demonstrate a saving of γ = lg n − O(1) bits in the encoding. Note that we are analyzing simple tabulation on a fixed set of n keys, so both the encoder and the decoder know S.
We will consider various cases, and give algorithms for encoding some subset of the hash codes (we can afford O(1) bits in the beginning of the encoding to say which case we are in). At the end, the encoder will always list all the remaining hash codes in order. If the algorithm chooses to encode k hash codes, it will use space at most k lg m − 1 3 lg n + O(1) bits. That is, it will save 1 3 lg n − O(1) bits in the complete encoding of h0 and h1.
An easy way out. A subkey is a set of position-characters on distinct positions. If a is a subkey, we let C(a) = {x ∈ S | a ⊆ x} be the set of "completions" of a to a valid key.
We first consider an easy way out: there subkeys a and b on the positions such that |C(a)| ≥ n 2/3 , |C(b)| ≥ n 2/3 , and hi(a) = hi(b) for some i ∈ {0, 1}. Then we can easily save completions each, so we can write the identities of a and b using 1 3 lg n bits each. We write the hash codes hi for all characters in a∆b (the symmetric difference of a and b), skipping the last one, since it can be deduced from the collision. This uses c + 1 + 2 · 1 3 lg n + (|a∆b| − 1) lg m bits to encode |a∆b| hash codes, so it saves 1 3 lg n − O(1) bits. The rest of the proof assumes that there is no easy way out.
Walking Along an Obstruction. Consider the bipartite graph with m nodes on each side and n edges going from h0(x) to h1(x) for all x ∈ S. Remember that cuckoo hashing succeeds if and only if no component in this graph has more edges than nodes. Assuming cuckoo hashing failed, the encoder can find a subgraph with one of two possible obstructions: (1) a cycle with a chord; or (2) two cycles connected by a path (possibly a trivial path, i.e. the cycles simply share a vertex).
Let v0 be a node of degree 3 in such an obstruction, and let its incident edges be a0, a1, a2. The obstruction can be traversed by a walk that leaves v0 on edge a0, returns to v0 on edge a1, leaves again on a2, and eventually meets itself. Other than visiting v0 and the last node twice, no node or edge is repeated. See Figure 1. Let x1, x2, . . . be the sequence of keys in the walk. The first key is x1 = a0. Technically, when the walk meets itself at the end, it is convenient to expand it with an extra key, namely the one it first used to get to the meeting point. This repeated key marks the end of the original walk, and we chose it so that it is not identical to the last original key. Let x ≤i = j≤i xj be the position-characters seen in keys up to xi. Definexi = xi \ x<i to be the position-characters of xi not seen previously in the sequence. Let k be the first position such thatx k+1 = ∅. Such a k certainly exists, since the last key in our walk is a repeated key.
At a high level, the encoding algorithm will encode the hash codes ofx1, . . . ,x k in this order. Note that the obstruction, hence the sequence (xi), depends on the hash functions h0 and h1. Thus, the decoder does not know the sequence, and it must also be written in the encoding.
For notational convenience, let hi = h i mod 2 . This means that in our sequence xi and xi+1 collide in their hi hash code, that is hi(xi) = hi(xi+1). Formally, we define 3 subroutines:
Id(x): Write the identity of x ∈ S in the encoding, which takes lg n bits. Hashes(hi, x k ): Write the hash codes hi of the characterŝ x k . This takes |x k | lg m bits. Coll(xi, xi+1): Document the collision hi(xi) = hi(xi+1).
We write all hi hash codes of charactersxi ∪xi+1 in some fixed order. The last hash code ofxi∆xi+1 is redundant and will be omitted. Indeed, the decoder can compute this last hash code from the equality hi(xi) = hi(xi+1). Sincexi+1 = xi+1 \ x ≤i , xi+1 \xi = ∅, so there exists a hash code inxi∆xi+1. This subroutine uses |xi ∪xi+1| − 1 lg m bits, saving lg m bits compared to the trivial alternative: Hashes(hi, xi); Hashes(hi, xi+1).
To decode the above information, the decoder will need enough context to synchronize with the coding stream. For instance, to decode Coll(xi, xi+1), one typically needs to know i, and the identities of xi and xi+1. Our encoding begins with the value k, encoded with O(lg k) bits, which allows the decoder to know when to stop. The encoding proceeds with the output of the stream of operations:
Id(x1);Hashes(h0, x1); Id(x2); Coll(x1, x2);
.
We observe that for each i > 1, we save ε bits of entropy. Indeed, Id(xi) uses lg n bits, but Coll(xi−1, xi) then saves lg m = lg((1 + ε)n) ≥ ε + lg n bits. The trouble is Id(x1), which has an upfront cost of lg n bits. We must devise algorithms that modify this stream of operations and save 4 3 lg n − O(1) bits, giving an overall saving of 1 3 lg n − O(1). (For intuition, observe that a saving that ignores the cost of Id(x1) bounds the probability of an obstruction at some fixed vertex in the graph. This probability must be much smaller than 1/n, so we can union bound over all vertices. In encoding terminology, this saving must be much more than lg n bits.)
We will use modifications to all types of operations. For instance, we will sometimes encode Id(x) with much less than lg n bits. At other times, we will be able to encode Coll(xi, xi+1) with the cost of |xi ∪xi+1| − 2 characters, saving lg n bits over the standard encoding.
Since we will make several such modifications, it is crucial to verify that they only touch distinct operations in the stream. Each modification to the stream will be announced at the beginning of the stream with a pointer taking O(lg k) bits. This way, the decoder knows when to apply the special algorithms. We note that terms of O(lg k) are negligible, since we are already saving εk bits by the basic encoding (ε bits per edge). For any k, O(lg k) ≤ εk + f (c, ε) = k + O(1). Thus, if our overall saving is 1 3 lg n − O(lg k) + εk, it achieves the stated bound of lg n − O(1).
Safe Savings. Remember thatx k+1 = ∅, which suggests that we can save a lot by local changes towards the end of the encoding. We have x k+1 ⊂ x ≤k , so x k+1 \ x <k ⊆x k . We will first treat the case when x k+1 \ x <k is a proper subset ofx k (including the empty subset). This is equivalent tô
Lemma 9 (safe-strong). Ifx k ⊂ x k+1 , we can save lg n − O(c lg k) bits by changing Hashes(x k ).
Proof. We can encode Id(x k+1 ) using c lg k extra bits, since it consists only of known characters from x ≤k . For each position 1 . . c, it suffices to give the index of a previous xi that contained the same position-character. Then, we will write all hash codes h k for the characters inx k , except for some
). All quantities on the right hand side are known (in particular α / ∈ x k+1 ), so the decoder can compute h k (α).
It remains to treat the case when the last revealed characters of x k+1 are preciselyx k :x k ⊂ x k+1 . That is, both x k and x k+1 consist ofx k and some previously known characters. In this case, the collision h k (x k ) = h k (x k+1 ) does not provide us any information, since it reduces to the trivial h k (x k ) = h k (x k ). Assuming that we didn't take the "easy way out", we can still guarantee a more modest saving of 1 3 lg n bits:
Lemma 10 (safe-weak). Let K be the set of positioncharacters known before encoding Id(xi), and assume there is no easy way out. If xi∆xi+1 ⊆ x<i, then we can encode both Id(xi) and Id(xi+1) using a total of 2 3 lg n + O(c lg |K|) bits.
A typical case where we apply the lemma is i = k and K = x <k . Ifx k ⊂ x k+1 , we have x k ∆x k+1 ⊂ K. Thus, we can obtain Id(x k ) for roughly 2 3 lg n bits, which saves 1 3 lg n bits.
Proof Proof of Lemma 10. With O(c lg k) bits, we can code the subkeys xi ∩ x<i and xi+1 ∩ x<i. It remains to code z = xi \ x<i = xi+1 \ x<i. Since z is common to both keys xi and xi+1, we have that xi \ z and xi+1 \ z are subkeys on the same positions. With no easy way out and hi(xi \ z) = hi(xi+1 \ z), we must have |C(xi \ z)| ≤ n 2/3 or |C(xi+1 \ z)| ≤ n 2/3 . In the former case, we code z as a member of C(xi \ z) with 2 3 lg n bits; otherwise we code z as member of C(xi+1 \ z).
Piggybacking. Before moving forward, we present a general situation when we can save lg n bits by modifying a Coll(xi, xi+1) operation:
Lemma 11. We can save lg n − O(lg k) bits by modifying Coll(xi, xi+1) if we have identified two (sub)keys e and f satisfying:
hi(e) = hi(f ); e∆f ⊂ x ≤i+1 ; ∅ = (e∆f )\x<i = (xi∆xi+1)\x<i.
Proof. In the typical encoding of Coll(xi, xi+1), we saved one redundant character from hi(xi) = hi(xi+1), which is an equation involving (xi∆xi+1) \ x<i and some known characters from x<i. The lemma guarantees a second linearly independent equation over the charactersxi ∪xi+1, so we can save a second redundant character.
Formally, let α be a position-character of (e∆f ) \ x<i, and β a position-character in (xi∆xi+1) \ x<i but outside (e∆f ) \ x<i. Note β = α and such a β exists by assumption. We write the hi hash codes of position characters (xi∪xi+1)\ {α, β}. The hash hi(α) can be deduced since α is the last unknown in the equality hi(e\f ) = hi(f \e). The hash hi(β) can be deduced since it is the last unknown in the equality hi(x) = hi(xi+1).
While the safe saving ideas only require simple local modifications to the encoding, they achieve a weak saving of 1 3 lg n bits for the casex k ⊂ x k+1 . A crucial step in our proof is to obtain a saving of lg n bits for this case. We do this by one of the following two lemmas:
Lemma 12 (odd-size saving). Consider two edges e, f and an i ≤ k − 2 satisfying:
We can save lg n − O(c lg k) bits by changing Coll(xi+1, xi+2).
Proof. We apply Lemma 11 with the subkeysẽ = e \ f andf = f \ e. We can identify these in O(c lg k) bits, since they only contain characters of x ≤i+1 . Since e and f have different free characters beforexi+1, but identical free characters afterward, it must be thatẽ ∪f ⊂ xi+1 bỹ e ∪f ⊆ x ≤i . To show (e∆f ) \ x<i = (xi+1∆xi+2) \ x ≤i , remark thatxi+2 = ∅ andxi+2 cannot have characters of e ∪f . Thus, Lemma 11 applies.
Lemma 13 (piggybacking). Consider two edges e, f and an i ≤ k − 1 satisfying:
We can encode Id(e) and Id(f ) using only O(c lg k) bits, after modifications to Id(xi), Id(xi+1), and Coll(xi, xi+1).
The proof of this lemma is more delicate, and is given below. The difference between the two lemmas is the parity (side in the bipartite graph) of the collision of xi and xi+1 versus the collision of e and f . In the second result, we cannot actually save lg n bits, but we can encode Id(e) and Id(f ) almost for free: we say e and f piggyback on the encodings of xi and xi+1.
Through a combination of the two lemmas, we can always achieve a saving lg n bits in the casex k ⊂ x k+1 , improving on the safe-weak bound:
We can save lg n − O(c lg k) bits if we may modify any operations in the stream, up to those involving x k+1 .
Proof. We will choose e = x k and f = x k+1 . We have e \ x <k = f \ x <k =x k . On the other hand, e \ x1 = f \ x1 since x1 only reveals one character per position. Thus there must be some 1 ≤ i < k − 1 where the transition happens: e \ x ≤i = f \ x ≤i but e \ x ≤i+1 = f \ x ≤i+1 . If i has the opposite parity compared to k, Lemma 12 saves a lg n term. (Note that i ≤ k − 2 as required by the lemma.)
If i has the same parity as k, Lemma 13 gives us Id(x k ) at negligible cost. Then, we can remove the operation Id(x k ) from the stream, and save lg n bits. (Again, note that i ≤ k − 2 as required.)
Proof of Lemma 13. The lemma assumed e \ x ≤i = f \ x ≤i but e \ x ≤i+1 = f \ x ≤i+1 . Therefore, e∆f ⊂ x ≤i+1 and (e∆f ) ∩xi+1 = ∅. Lemma 11 applies if we furthermore have (e∆f )\x<i = (xi∆xi+1)\x<i. If the lemma applies, we have a saving of lg n, so we can afford to encode Id(e). Then Id(f ) can be encoded using O(c lg k) bits, since f differs from e only in position-characters from x ≤i+1 .
If the lemma does not apply, we have a lot of structure on the keys. Let y =xi \ (e ∪ f ) and g = e \ x ≤i+1 = f \ x ≤i+1 . We must have y ⊂ xi+1, for otherwisexi \ xi+1 contains an elements outside e∆f and the lemma applies. We must also havexi+1 ⊂ e ∪ f .
We can write Id(xi), Id(xi+1), Id(e), and Id(f ) using 2 lg n + O(c lg k) bits in total, as follows:
• the coordinates on which y and g appear, taking 2c bits.
• the value of y using Huffman coding. Specifically, we consider the projection of all n keys on the coordinates of y. In this distribution, y has frequency
, so its Huffman code will use lg n C(y)
• the value of g using Huffman coding. This uses lg n C(g) + O(1) bits.
• if C(y) ≤ C(g), we write xi and xi+1. Each of these requires log 2 C(y) bits, since y ⊂ xi, xi+1 and there are C(y) completions of y to a full key. Using an additional O(c lg k) bits, we can write e ∩ x ≤i+1 and f ∩ x ≤i+1 . Remember that we already encoded g = e \ x ≤i+1 = f \ x ≤i+1 , so the decoder can recover e and f .
• if C(g) < C(y), we write e and f , each requiring log 2 C(g) bits. Since we know y =xi \(e∪f ), we can write xi using O(c lg k) bits: write the old characters outsidexi, and which positions of e ∪ f to reuse inxi. We showedxi+1 ⊂ e ∪ f , so we can also write xi+1 using O(c lg k).
Overall, the encoding uses space: lg
Putting it Together. We now show how to obtain a saving of at least 4 3 lg n − O(c lg k) bits by a careful combination of the above techniques. Recall that our starting point is three edges a0, a1, a2 with h0(a0) = h0(a1) = h0(a2). The walk x1, ..., x k+1 started with x1 = a0 and finished when x k+1 = ∅. We will now involve the other starting edges a1 and a2. The analysis will split into many cases, each ended by a '3'.
Case 1: One of a1 and a2 contains a free character. Let j ∈ {1, 2} such that aj ⊆ x ≤k . Let y1 = aj. We consider a walk y1, y2, . . . along the edges of the obstruction.Letŷi = yi \ x ≤k \ y ≤i be the free characters of yi (which also takes all xi's into consideration). We stop the walk the first time we observeŷ +1 = ∅. This must occur, since the graph is finite and there are no leaves (nodes of degree one) in the obstruction. Thus, at the latest the walk stops when it repeats an edge.
We use the standard encoding for the second walk:
Id(y1);Coll(a0, y1); Id(y2); Coll(y2, y1); . . . ;Id(y ); Coll(y −1 , y ); Hashes(h , y )
Note that every pair Id(yj), Coll(yj−1, yj) saves ε bits, including the initial Id(y1), Coll(a0, y1). To end the walk, we can use one of the safe savings of Lemmas 9 and 10. These give a saving of 1 3 lg n − O(c lg( + k)) bits, by modifying only Hashes(h , y ) or Id(y ). These local changes cannot interfere with the first walk, so we can use any technique (including piggybacking) to save lg n − O(c log k) bits from the first walk. We obtain a total saving of 4 3 lg n − O(1), as required.
3 We are left with the situation a1 ∪a2 ⊆ x ≤k . This includes the case when a1 and a2 are actual edges seen in the walk x1, . . . , x k .
Let tj be the first time aj becomes known in the walk; that is, aj ⊆ x<t j but aj ⊆ x ≤t j . By symmetry, we can assume t1 ≤ t2. We begin with two simple cases.
Case 2: For some j ∈ {1, 2}, tj is even and tj < k. We will apply Lemma 11 and save lg n − O(c lg k) bits by modifying Coll(xt j , xt j +1). Since tj < k, this does not interact with safe savings at the end of the stream, so we get total saving of at least 4 3 lg n − O(c lg k). We apply Lemma 11 on the keys e = a0 and f = aj. We must first write Id(aj), which takes O(c lg k) bits given x ≤k . We have a0 ∪aj ⊆ x ≤t j by definition of tj. Since aj ∩xt j = ∅ andxt j +1 ∩ (aj ∪ a0) = ∅, the lemma applies.
3 Case 3: For some j ∈ {1, 2}, tj is odd and aj \ x<t j −1 =xt j −1∆xt j . This assumption is exactly what we need to apply Lemma 11 with e = a0 and f = aj. Note that h0(e) = h0(f ) and tj is odd, so the lemma modifies Coll(xt j −1, xt j ). The lemma can be applied in conjunction with any safe saving, since the safe savings only require modifications to Id(x k ) or Hashes(h k , x k ).
3 We now deal with two cases when t1 = t2 (both being odd or even). These require a combination of piggybacking followed by safe-weak savings. Note that in the odd case, we may assume a1 \ x<t−1 = a2 \ x<t−1 =xt−1∆xt (due to case 3 above), and in the even case we may assume t1 = t2 = k (due to case 2 above).
Case 4: t1 = t2 = t is odd and a1 \ x<t−1 = a2 \ x<t−1 =xt−1∆xt. We first get a1 and a2 by piggybacking or odd-side saving. Let i be the largest value such that a1 \ x ≤i = a2 \ x ≤i . Since a1 \ x<t−1 = a2 \ x<t−1, we have i ≤ t − 3. The last key that piggybacking or odd-side saving can interfere with is xt−2.
We will now use the safe-weak saving of Lemma 10 to encode Id(xt−1) and Id(xt). The known characters are K = x<t−1 ∪ a1 ∪ a2, so xt−1∆xt ⊆ K. Lemma 10 codes both Id(xt−1) and Id(xt) with 2 3 lg n + O(c lg k) bits, which represents a saving of roughly 4 3 lg n over the original encoding of the two identities. We don't need any more savings from the rest of the walk after xt. 3 Case 5: t1 = t2 = k is even. Thus, k is even and the last characters of a1 and a2 are only revealed byx k .
Lemma 15. We can save 2 lg n − O(c lg k) bits by modifying Hashes(h k , x k ), unless both: (1) a1 ∩x k = a2 ∩x k ; and (2)x k \ x k+1 is the empty set or equal to a1 ∩x k .
Proof. The h0 hash codes of the following 3 subkeys are known from the hash codes in x <k : a1 ∩x k , a2 ∩x k (both because we know h0(a0) = h0(a1) = h0(a2)), and x k \ x k+1 (since x k and x k+1 collide). If two of these subsets are distinct and nonempty, we can choose two characters α and β from their symmetric difference. We can encode all characters ofx k except for α and β, whose hash codes can be deduced for free.
Since aj ∩x k = in the current case, the situations when we can find two distinct nonempty sets are: (1) a1∩x k = a2∩x k ; or (2) a1 ∩x k = a2 ∩x k butx k \ x k+1 is nonempty and different from them.
From now on assume the lemma fails. We can still save lg n bits by modifying Hashes(h k , x k ). We reveal all hash codes ofx k , except for one position-character α ∈ a1 ∩x k . We then specify Id(a1), which takes O(c lg k) bits. The hash h0(α) can then be deduced from h0(a1) = h0(a0).
We will now apply piggybacking or odd-side saving to a1 and a2. Let i be the largest value with a1 \ x ≤i = a2 \ x ≤i . Note that a1 \ x <k = a2 \ x <k , so i < k − 1. If i is odd, Lemma 12 (odd-side saving) can save lg n bits by modifying Coll(xi+1, xi+2); this works since i + 2 ≤ k. If i is even, Lemma 13 (piggybacking) can give use Id(a) and Id(b) at a negligible cost of O(c lg k) bits. This doesn't touch anything later than Id(xi+1), where i + 1 < k.
When we arrive at Id(x k ), we know the position characters K = x <k ∪ a1 ∪ a2. This means that x k ∆x k+1 ⊆ K, becausê x k \ x k+1 is either empty or a subset of a1. Therefore, we can use weak-safe savings from Lemma 10 to code Id(x k ) in just 1 3 lg n + O(c lg k) bits. In total, we have save at least 4 3 lg n − O(c lg k) bits.
3 It remains to deal with distinct t1, t2, i.e. t1 < t2 ≤ k. If one of the numbers is even, it must be t2 = k, and then t1 must be odd (due to case 2). By Case 3, if tj is odd, we also know aj \ x<t j −1 =xt j −1∆xt j . Since these cases need to deal with at least one odd tj, the following lemma will be crucial:
Lemma 16. If tj ≤ k is odd and aj \x<t j −1 =xt j −1∆xt j , we can code Id(xt j −1) and Id(xt j ) with 3 2 lg n+O(c lg k) bits in total.
Proof. Consider the subkey y =xt j −1 \ xt j . We first specify the positions of y using c bits. If C(y) ≥ √ n, there are at most √ n possible choices of y, so we can specify y with 1 2 lg n bits. We can also identify xt j with lg n bits. Then Id(xt j −1) requires O(c lg k) bits, since xt j −1 ⊆ y ∪ xt j ∪ x<t j −1.
If C(y) ≤ √ n, we first specify Id(xt j −1) with lg n bits. This gives us the subkey y ⊆ xt j −1. Since aj \ x<t j −1 = xt j −1∆xt j , it follows that y ⊂ aj. Thus, we can write Id(aj) using lg C(y) ≤ lg 1 2 lg n bits. Since xt j ⊆ x ≤t j −1 ∪ aj, we get Id(xt j ) for an additional O(c lg k) bits.
Case 6: Both t1 and t2 are odd, t1 < t2 < k, and for all j ∈ {1, 2}, aj \ x<t j −1 =xt j −1∆xt j . We apply Lemma 16 for both j = 1 and j = 2, and save lg n bits in coding Id(xt 1 −1), Id(xt 1 ), Id(xt 2 −1), and Id(xt 2 ). These are all distinct keys, because t1 < t2 and both are odd. Since t2 < k, we can combine this with any safe saving.
3
